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ABSTRACT
Malware Scores Based on Image Processing
by Vikash Raja Samuel Selvin
Malware analysis can be based on static or dynamic analysis. Static analysis
includes signature-based detection and other forms of analysis rely only on features
that can be extracted without code execution or emulation. In contrast, dynamic
analysis depends on features extracted at runtime (or via emulation) such as API calls,
patterns of memory access, and so on. Dynamic analysis can be more informative
and is generally more robust, but static analysis is typically more efficient. In this
research, we implement, test, and analyze malware scores based on image processing.
Previous work has shown that useful malware scores can be obtained when binaries
are treated as images. We test a wide variety of image processing techniques and
machine learning techniques. Further, we develop a dataset that is designed to evade
detection mechanisms that employ image analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
When computers became ubiquitous so did malware. Any software written with
the intention to damage or disable computers and computer systems is called as
Malware. Malware writers started out writing code to show off their skills or for
research purposes but that soon took a turn for the worse when computer systems
started becoming the cornerstone of all sorts of businesses and organizations. Nowadays,
most malware are targeted at profit through gaining access to confidential data or
destruction of data or denial of services. Hence, it is important to develop efficient
methods that could shield the computer systems from these malware.
Classifying malware is a very hard problem to tackle, the reason being innumerable
variants being created on an everyday basis. Antivirus vendor Symantec came out
with a report that said it had over 286 million variants of malware in its database [1].
Static and dynamic analysis are the most commonly employed techniques in analyzing
malware. Signature based detection methods form a core part of static analysis [2].
Typically, in static analysis, the malware is not executed and features such as the
machine level ‘‘opcodes’’, the actual binary representation of the executable are used.
Dynamic analysis typically refers to methods wherein the malware is executed under
a controlled environment and various actions of malware such as the Application
Program Interface (API) calls it makes, pattern of memory access etc are used as
features. Drawbacks of the aforementioned approaches [3, 4, 5, 6] will be discussed
in the next two chapters, from these discussions it will become apparent that there
is a need for new robust mechanisms that are unaffected by the strategies that are
currently being used to defeat traditional malware analysis methods.
In this research, we will be using techniques from the domain of image detection.
The underlying idea is to convert malware binaries in to images and then calculate gist
1

descriptors from the images. A gist descriptor gives a low dimensional representation
of the image which could be used to reliably recognize similar images. This technique
would help us to identify variants of the same malware family as they tend to be
visually similar even if code obfuscation techniques were used for generating the
variations. This research also aims to determine the optimum number of features
required to successfully cluster similar images and also discusses methods that aim to
defeat the gist based detection technique. It also looks at the use of and effectiveness
of neural networks for clustering similar malware images.
This paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides details on types of malware.
Chapter 3 provide details on drawbacks of static and dynamic analysis respectively.
Chapter 4 discusses about using gist descriptors for image recognition and feature
selection techniques for reducing the dimensionality of the data. Chapter 5 discusses
about using deep learning techniques for malware image recognition and using the
TensorFlow framework for it. Chapter 6 concludes the paper after discussing attempts
at trying to defeat the gist based scores and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Types of Malware
Malware refers to any software that intends to damage or disable computers or
computer systems. There are many types of malware including but not limited to
Adware, Spyware, Ransomware, Virus, Worm, Trojan, Rootkit, Backdoors, Keyloggers,
Rogue security software, Browser hijacker. In this chapter, we will look into different
types of malware based on their action, concealment strategy and detection evasion
techniques used.
2.1

Types of Malware - Based on Action, Concealment Strategy
Adware displays ads on your computer and generates revenue based on that for

the malware writer. This is mostly innocuous but might be irritating in that it might
open multiple browser windows to display multiple ads at the same time [7].
Spyware is a kind of malware that tracks your online presence in order to send
targeted ads to your computer. For example, say if you are looking for cars, then a
car company might use this data to send you ads about their new cars [7].
Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts data in infected system or alters
its access privileges or blocks access to the computer until a sum of money is paid.
This is currently used against individual computers most of the time [8].
Virus is a self replicating program that mostly attach themselves to other programs.
They try to infect their targets and conceal themselves, they are parasitic by nature
and reside in the boot sector, executables or data files. They are usually spread by
sharing files and portable memory sticks between computers [9].
Worms are programs that replicate and multiply and repeat this process over
and over again thereby effectively choking the system and its resources. They are
usually spread through the network [10].
Trojans are programs that conceal or disguise themselves as other benign files
3

and they aim to discover bank credentials, take over computer resources, and in larger
systems creates a denial-of-service attack. Even though they are usually disguised
as some innocuous file like images or benign executables or videos if you look close
enough you will find that the extension differs [11].
Rootkit is a type of malware that resides in the boot sector and as a result is
amongst the first programs to start in the machine when it gets power. Since it is very
hard to detect it is also hard to remove them. These type of malware are typically
used to create a back door in to the system so that other, more advanced malware
could exploit it for gain [12].
Backdoor works by bypassing authentication and gaining remote access to the
infected system. It usually waits for commands from a command and control center.
Harebot.M is an example of a backdoor malware [13].
Keyloggers are designed to conceal themselves and keep running in the background
and record, transmit every key stroke being executed on the machine. Nowadays they
are advanced enough to capture screens and transmit them securely over to a remote
server [14].
Rogue security software impersonate an anti-virus product. They often turn off
the real anti-virus products and trick you into believing that these are legitimate
programs [15].
Browser hijacker is designed to route you to pages that would bring money to
the malware writers. They work by redirecting the browser traffic to pages of the
malware writer’s choice [16].
2.2

Types of Malware - Based on Evasion Strategy
In order to evade detection, malware writers have come up with various effective

techniques, we will be seeing some of those techniques below.
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Encrypted Virus work by encrypting the critical code, so that they do not show
up on the signature scan. When the virus executes based on some predefined condition
the decryption code kicks in and decrypts the critical part at runtime. However, the
problem is that the decryption part would be fairly standard and that could be used
for scanning the signatures [9].
Oligomorphic Virus is an improvement over the encrypted virus. They try to
offset the weakness in the encrypted virus by having multiple versions of the decryption
code. But this will not be that detrimental to the anti-virus product as it will simply
add all versions of the decryption code to their databases [17].
Polymorphic virus is written by encapsulating the layer of encryption and the
decryption code is programmed in such a way that it changes its form and hence
evades detection. These can be detected by allowing them to run in an emulator and
let the code decrypt itself and after that looking for the signature [18].
Metamorphic virus are the most advanced of all malware. They work by changing
the entire code every time they are run. They usually have a mutation engine which
serves up several obfuscation techniques to evade signature detection. Since this is
the most advanced of all malware it is also the most difficult of malware’s to write.
This is a challenging problem for anti-virus companies and researchers alike [17].
2.3

Malware Detection Methods
There are two traditional analysis methods used for malware detection, they are

static and dynamic analysis.
The unique characteristic about static analysis is that they do not execute the
malware file and extract features that include but are not limited to opcodes, binary
representation of the program, function names, etc. This results in a faster turn
around time and lesser risk. Antivirus programs then try signature matching, i.e.,

5

they compare the signature obtained from the malware file to a known database that
they maintain. If a match is found, then the file is tagged as a malware. Algorithms
like Aho-Corasick [5, 19] allow for efficient string matching which keeps the running
time of this approach manageable. However, this approach could be defeated by using
various code obfuscation techniques which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Dynamic Analysis of malware refers to techniques in which the malware is run
in a sandboxed environment and various features such as windows API calls, stack
contents, actual function parameters, etc are extracted from it which is then used
for classifying it as a malware. Dynamic analysis is costlier than static analysis but
genereally yields better performance. Though it is harder to defeat it has been shown
that it is possible to defeat it, we will discuss some of these techniques in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Drawbacks of Traditional Malware Analysis Methods
Some of methods used by malware writers for defeating static and dynamic
analysis techniques are explained herein. In general, static analysis has been shown to
be weak against code obfuscation techniques and dynamic analysis has been shown to
be expensive and it produces lots of false positives.
3.1

Drawbacks of Static Analysis
As discussed in the previous section, static analysis refers to the technique of

extracting features from a malware without running it. Machine level opcodes, the
original binary program, function calls and API, variable names. From these features
a signature, which is a just a string of bits, is extracted and matched against a known
database. Efficient string comparison algorithms like Aho-Corasick [5, 19] ensure
that this process runs in acceptable time frames. [3] discusses some of the techniques
that could be used for defeating scores based on static analysis, these include using
opaque constants, control flow obfuscation, data location obfuscation and data usage
obfuscation.
1. Opaque constants --- Constant values are used in many places in the binary and
are often involved in branching control flows, supplied as operands of arithmetic
expressions, etc. Substituting expressions that produce values which are equal
to the constant’s value [3] would result in different bits being generated in the
binary form of the malware. For example, instead of using constant value take
an exclusive or with zero to get an equivalent value. The examples shown below
explain how a code fragment could be written to manipulate opaque constants.
Suppose the value 40 is to be assigned to a variable, then this is one way
to do it:
7

constant = 40;
The above value could be generated in a number of other ways, for example,
given below is one other way to generate the same constant:
f o r ( i =0; i<= 4 0 ; i ++)
{
Pass ;
}
constant = i ;
2. Control flow obfuscation --- A control flow graph is defined as a directed graph
𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) in which the vertices represent basic blocks and an edge represents
the flow of control between the two vertices [3]. Unconditional jump and calls
could be replaced with a sequence of instructions that perform the same thing
but is difficult to determine.
3. Data location obfuscation --- Data elements are located by specifying a constant
address. A static analyzer could be misled by using opaque constants for
specifying the location and hiding the data elements [3].
4. Data usage obfuscation --- Static analyzers are good at identifying the chain of
operations that lead to a value being stored in a register, so with data usage
obfuscation the idea is to spill values to an obfuscated memory location and
then reload it later [3, 6] discusses techniques like encryption which could also
be used for scrambling the binary form of the malware. Encrypting parts of the
malware program makes sure that the binary form of it is just a meaningless
random combination of zeros and ones. The decryption code then decrypts this
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encrypted block when the malware is executed. The code fragment below shows
an example of a malware decrypting itself based on some condition.
i f ( Hash (cmd) == Hash ( ‘ ‘DECRYPT’ ’ ) )
{
X = d e c r y p t ( Hash (cmd ) , payload )
execute X

}
[4] discusses techniques like dead-code insertion, register reassignment, subroutine reordering, code transposition, code integration.
5. Dead-code insertion --- This is a very simple mechanism in which the malware
writer inserts some random instructions that have no effect on the flow of the
program or no operation instructions [4].
6. Register reassignment --- In this technique the register being used is switched
around for each generation of then malware [4]. Figure 1 shows an example of a
code fragment that performs register reassignment using the well know EAX,
EBX and EDX registers.

Figure 1: Register reassignment techniques by using multiple registers to achieve
same result.
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7. Subroutine reordering --- In this technique the order of the various subroutines
is changed in some random order in each malware generation [5].
8. Code transposition --- In this technique the sequence of instructions in the
original code are reordered without having an impact on the behavior of the
malware [5].
9. Code integration --- In this technique the malware appends itself to the code of
its target program, the target being a benign program [5].
The consensus is that malware writers have become wise to the use of signature
based detection methods and have begun incorporating various code obfuscation
techniques into their malware to evade the antivirus products. Hence, there is a need
for a detection mechanism which is robust in the face of code obfuscation techniques.
3.2

Drawbacks of Dynamic Analysis
Analyzing actions performed by a malware while it is running is called dynamic

analysis. In dynamic analysis, the malware binary is run in an emulated operating
system environment and its security related events are monitored. The windows API
calls, native system calls that the program uses are monitored [20]. Figure 2 shows
the usage of IDA Pro software for tracing function calls of a malware script.
Function call monitoring, function parameter analysis, information flow tracking,
instruction trace, AutoStart Extensibility Points(ASEP) are some of the information
being collected during dynamic analysis [20].
1. Function call monitoring --- Functions are used to abstract implementation
details. For analyzing the behavior of a malware program it is very useful to see
what happens in these functions. The process of intercepting functions is called
hooking. Once the function is hooked it can be used to analyze the contents of
10

Figure 2: Malware analysis using IDA Pro for extraction of function calls.
the stack, parameters and so on [20].
2. Function parameter analysis --- Dynamic function parameter analysis is used for
getting the arguments that are actually passed to the function during runtime.
Tracking these parameters would be useful in finding correlation of individual
function calls that operate on the same object [20]. This provides a detailed
insight into the program’s behavior from an object centric view.
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3. Information flow tracking --- The goal of information flow tracking is to track
the flow of ‘‘interesting’’ information as the program executes. Taint sources
and taint sinks form an important part of this technique. Taint sources are
the ones from where tainted data is introduced into the program flow and taint
sink is a specific component of the system that reacts in a certain way when
simulated with the tainted source [20].
4. Instruction trace --- In this technique a trace of the low level machine instructions
is traced as the program executes. This could reveal information that was
potentially missed when looking at high level instructions.
5. AutoStart Extensibility Points(ASEP) --- ASEPs provide a mechanism for programs to be automatically invoked upon the operating system boot process [20].
Typically, malwares would persist by using these ASEPs.
Though dynamic analysis techniques offer a very good precision in recognizing
malware it would not scale well, it takes a lot of time for extracting these features.
Since it takes almost close to 3 minutes in some cases, this cannot be used for
production cases. Also, it tend to produce a lot of false positives as it finds benign
processes which might be making calls that might be out of the norm. False positives
drastically reduce the confidence that users have on the anti-virus product which is
why anti-virus products are calibrated to have high tolerance about processes they
are not sure about classifying as malware.
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CHAPTER 4
Image Processing Techniques
In order to overcome the short comings of both static and dynamic analysis [3, 4,
5, 6], it is important to find techniques that are robust in the face of code obfuscation
and can provide detection rates that are of practical use without raising a lot of false
positives. Image processing techniques come in handy to fill that void. The idea
is that malware binaries are visualized as grey scale images, with the observation
being that malware variants belonging to the same family produce similar images [21].
From these images, gist features are then extracted which are used to group together
malware belonging to the same family [21].
4.1

Gist Features
Gist is a low dimensional representation of the scene, which does not require any

form of segmentation [22]. gist descriptors capture the dominant spatial structures of
a scene along perceptual dimensions of Naturalness, Openness, Roughness, Expansion,
Ruggedness. They yield a low-dimensional descriptor (feature vector) of the entire
image, which is called a Spatial Envelope.
gist is used in scene recognition by considering global configurations without
detailed object configuration [22, 23]. Gist computes the spectral information in an
image through Discrete Fourier Transform. The spectral signals are then compressed
by the Karhunen-Loeve Transform. The above mentioned perceptual dimensions were
shown to be reliably estimated from these spectral signals.
The principal idea behind using gist descriptors is that images produced by
different variations of the same malware family tend to be very similar and code
obfuscation techniques do not transform the image sufficiently for it to not be grouped
together when considering the gist features.
Gist has been proved to return very good results in web-scale image search [23].
13

And the results from using gist for classifying malware variants belonging to 25 different
families also proved to be good returning almost 98 percent accuracy. Figure 3 shows
different variants of the malware family Dialplatform.B

Figure 3: All variants of the malware family Dialplatform.B.
4.2

Evaluation of gist descriptors
Table 1 lists the conditions under which this experiment was carried out. Python

2.7 was used on Ubuntu 14.04. Leargist, Numpy, sklearn were some of the important
packages used, when it came to datasets both ‘‘Malicia’’ and ‘‘Malimg’’ were used in
these experiments.
OS
Ubuntu 14.04
Python
2.7
Python Libraries Numpy, Leargist, PIL, scipy, sklearn, Matplotlib
Datasets
Malicia, Malimg
Table 1: Experimental Setup for gist based scoring.

By using the gist descriptor as features and running a K-Means algorithm we
14

were able to achieve very good results with the Malimg Dataset. The Malimg dataset
consists of 9000 malware files belonging to 25 malware families and their variants.
Table 2 shows the various families in ‘‘Malimg’’ dataset. All these malware binaries
were converted to images and gist features were extracted from them.
FAMILY NAME NO OF FILES
Adialer.C
122
Agent.FYI
116
Allaple.A
2949
Allaple.L
1591
Alueron.gen!J
198
Autorun.K
106
C2LOP.gen!g
200
C2LOP.P
146
Dialplatform.B
177
Dontovo.A
162
Fakerean
381
Instantaccess
431
Lolyda.AA1
213
Lolyda.AA2
184
Lolyda.AA3
123
Lolyda.AT
159
Malex.gen!J
136
Obfuscator.AD
142
Rbot!gen
158
Skintrim.N
80
Swizzor.gen!E
128
Swizzor.gen!I
132
VB.AT
408
Wintrim.BX
97
Yuner.A
800
Total
9339
Table 2: Malimg Dataset.

The gist features were then clustered together using K-Means clustering algorithm.
The average classification accuracy was 97%. Figure 4 shows the confusion matrix for
this dataset.
15

Figure 4: Confusion Matrix with all features.
4.3

Feature Selection and Further Experiments
In order to ascertain that the gist based scores would work on all general malware

images and not just the ‘‘Malimg’’ dataset, it was tested with the more challenging
‘‘Malicia’’ dataset. ‘‘Malicia’’ dataset contains 11363 samples which are primarily made
up of ZBot, WinWebSec, ZeroAccess malware families. Table 3 below gives the details
about the various malware families in the ‘‘Malicia’’ dataset and the corresponding
number of files in each family.
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FAMILY NAME NO OF FILES
cleaman
32
CLUSTER:184.82.148.49
1
CLUSTER:217.20.115.99
1
CLUSTER:46.105.131.121
20
CLUSTER:85.93.17.123
45
CLUSTER:91.234.32.10
5
CLUSTER:astaror
24
CLUSTER:azonpowzanadinoar.com
1
CLUSTER:bundlemonkey.com
1
CLUSTER:chapterleomemorykombo.eu
9
CLUSTER:clarkclark
1
CLUSTER:dzony3777.su
1
CLUSTER:eikons.com
1
CLUSTER:foreign
6
CLUSTER:in7cy
1
CLUSTER:justontime-12.com
1
CLUSTER:landtechdata.com
1
CLUSTER:m9swachu.be
1
CLUSTER:mergenew
4
CLUSTER:newavr
29
CLUSTER:online-police.com
2
CLUSTER:paydayloatnsstc.ru
1
CLUSTER:positivtkn.in.ua
14
CLUSTER:price.dtdns.net
1
CLUSTER:up2x.com
1
CLUSTER:whatismyip.com
1
cridex
74
cutwail
2
fakeav-rena
3
fakeav-webprotection
3
harebot
53
NULL
1646
ramnit
5
smarthdd
68
spyeye-ep
7
ufasoft-bitcoin
3
winwebsec
5820
zbot
2186
zeroaccess
1306
Total
11363
Table 3: Malicia Dataset.
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Experiments were carried out by taking a subset of the Malicia dataset and
Benign exe’s (Windows executables) so as to prevent the bias which arises out of
having a very large number of files belonging to one class. From the table above, it
could be seen that the families of zbot, winwebsec, zeroaccess could very easily create
a bias and hence this approach is taken. The experiment was repeated for various
splits of training and test data ranging from 30%,70% split to 90%,10%. The results
from these experiments are discussed below.
Table 4 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 30% data for training
and 70% data for testing is around 84%.

TRAINING
TESTING

BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

69

51

13

14

21

182

93

40

28

49

% OF TRAIN

30%

% TEST

70%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

84.43%
Table 4: Accuracy Results - 30/70 Train/Test Split.

Table 5 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 40% data for training
and 60% data for testing improves to around 87%.
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BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

TRAINING

100

57

22

22

23

TESTING

151

87

31

20

47

% - TRAIN

40%

% - TEST

60%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

87.79%
Table 5: Accuracy Results - 40/60 Train/Test Split.

Table 6 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 50% data for training
and 50% data for testing improves to around 88%.
BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

TRAINING

131

67

26

21

35

TESTING

120

77

27

21

35

% - TRAIN

50%

% - TEST

50%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

88.21%
Table 6: Accuracy Results - 50/50 Train/Test Split.

Table 7 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 60% data for training
and 40% data for testing the accuracy drops to around 85%.
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BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

TRAINING

142

94

29

25

46

TESTING

109

50

24

24

17

% - TRAIN

60%

% - TEST

40%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

85.26%
Table 7: Accuracy Results - 60/40 Train/Test Split.

Table 8 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 70% data for training
and 30% data for testing the accuracy improves to around 89%.

TRAINING
TESTING

BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

176

97

35

32

52

75

47

18

10

18

% - TRAIN

70%

% - TEST

30%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

89.88%
Table 8: Accuracy Results - 70/30 Train/Test Split.

Table 9 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 80% data for training
and 20% data for testing the accuracy improves to around 92%.
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TRAINING
TESTING

BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

196

188

41

38

55

55

26

12

4

15

% - TRAIN

80%

% - TEST

20%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

92.85%
Table 9: Accuracy Results - 80/20 Train/Test Split.

Table 10 shows that the accuracy of classification when using 90% data for
training and 10% data for testing the accuracy stays at around 92%.

TRAINING
TESTING

BENIGN

FAMILY
W.WEBSEC ZBOT

Z.ACCESS

OTHERS

227

134

46

38

59

24

10

7

4

11

% - TRAIN

80%

% - TEST

20%

ACCURACY

NO OF NEIGHBOURS

3

92.85%
Table 10: Accuracy Results - 90/10 Train/Test Split.

Figure 5 shows the variation in accuracy with different splits for training and
test data.
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Figure 5: Malicia Dataset - Accuracy vs % Training Data.
Feature selection was carried out next. The aim of performing feature selection
was to ascertain what would be the optimum set of features that need to be used for
achieving high accuracy. SVM recursive feature elimination was the choice to see
when we get the best RoC for the Malicia dataset, it was found that 320 was the
optimal number of features.
Further, experiments were carried out with ‘‘univariate feature selection’’ from
the python scikit package. Univariate statistics focuses on identifying features that are
able to describe the data best. It can be seen as a preprocessing step to an estimator.
‘‘SelectKBest’’ retains only the 𝑘 top features using metrics like false positive rate,
false discovery rate, or family wise error for each feature. It was found that even if
only the top 60 features are chosen, we still get very good results.
Figure 6 shows the confusion matrix for Malimg dataset with just 60 of the
original number of features.
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Figure 6: Confusion Matrix with 60 features.
Also, on the Malicia dataset we achieve 98.5% and 99.25% accuracy with 80%
and 90% training data respectively.Hence it is concluded that combining univariate
feature selection with first 60 gist descriptors gives us a very good scoring algorithm
which is also very efficient.
It follows that the next step would be to find ways to defeat the score obtained
using these gist features. The first idea that was tried was to salt the malware images
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with another image and this leads to several questions like:
1. What happens when only one family’s images are salted with an external image?
2. What happens when closely related families are salted with similar external
images?
3. What happens when all families are salted with the same external images?
Experiments were conducted to answer the above questions and the findings are
reported below.
When only one family’s images are salted with an external image it should follow
that the family’s classification score should improve. This is because due to the
addition of the salted image, the images belonging to this family would now be more
unique and hence they will be fewer mis-classifications.
To ascertain this an experiment was conducted wherein only the images belonging
to ‘‘Allaple.L’’ family were salted. This resulted in the score going up from 98%
to 100%. Figures 7, 8 show the scores before and after the salting of the images
respectively.
The next question is what would happen when closely related families are salted
with similar external images? It should follow that the scores should go down for both
the families. Our experiments also confirmed this. For this run we chose ‘‘Allaple.L’’
and ‘‘Allaple.A’’ families and salted both these families with images from an external
image dataset. The result is that the scores came down to 85% and 93% respectively.
Figure 9 shows the same.
Figure 10 shows the comparison of the accuracy scores before and after the salting
of images.
Next, the malware images were salted with benign exe files to see if that was able
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Figure 7: Confusion Matrix Results - Before Salting.
to defeat the scores. The confusion matrix is shown in Figure 11. Though it performed
better than salting by random images it still did not break the scores completely.
A Support Vector Classifier (SVC) was tried next instead of the usual K-Nearest
Neighbours algorithm. The confusion matrix is shown in Figure 12. It could be seen
from the figure that the SVC did not fare well.
The next approach towards breaking the scores was to see what effect interleaving
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Figure 8: Confusion Matrix Results - After Salting.
images has on the gist features and the corresponding scores. All the methods
mentioned above stack the images vertically hence it was interesting to look at what
interleaving does to the scores. Accordingly, we interleaved images belonging to
‘‘Allaple.A’’, ‘‘Allaple.L’’, ‘‘Fakerean’’ families using benign executables. The results
are surprisingly not that bad, gist feature scores are still good enough. Figure 13
shows the confusion matrix for this approach.
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Figure 9: Confusion Matrix Results - After Salting.

Figure 10: Accuracy Comparision - Before and After Salting.
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Figure 11: Confusion Matrix - After Salting with Benign Exes.
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Figure 12: Confusion Matrix - After Salting with Benign Exes and using SVC.
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Figure 13: Confusion Matrix - After Interleaving with Benign Exes and using SVC.
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CHAPTER 5
Experimenting with Deep Learning
Deep learning using layers of neural networks is the goto technique of computer
scientists nowadays when dealing with challenges in computer vision and image
processing [24]. Neural networks have been shown to be successful with various
categories of image processing problems including but not limited to image recognition,
image segmentation et all. Google’s Inceptionv3 and Facebook Artificial Intelligence
Research(FAIR) teams came up with pretty good success rates when dealing with the
problems in the domain of image classification and object segmentation respectively [25,
26]. Hence, with all these advancements in technology related to deep learning, it
was a natural next step to see if these techniques could be leveraged to gain an
improvement over the accuracy achieved with gist features.
5.1

Tensorflow for Deep Learning
Neural networks were out of vogue till the recent past owing to the humongous

amount of data needed to train them. One of the reasons why neural networks have
gained traction in the recent years is the advances made in the fields of hardware
and software required to process the large amount of data associated with them [27].
With the recent advancement in GPU technology and software like TensorFlow it is
no longer impractical to train neural networks [27, 28].
TensorFlow™ is an open source software library by Google for numerical computation using data flow graphs. Tensorflow is the successor of the earlier closed source
‘‘DistBelief’’ from Google which was used for training and deploying neural networks
for pattern recognition [28].
The unit of data in TensorFlow is a set of primitive values shaped into a ndimensional array. TensorFlow programs can be thought of as comprising the below
sections:
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1. Building the Computational Graph
2. Running the Computational Graph
A computational graph is a series of TensorFlow operations arranged into a graph
of nodes. A node may or may not have a tensor as its input but it usually produces a
tensor as output. Once the computational graph is created you could evaluate / run
it by creating a session, which encapsulates the control and state of the TensorFlow
runtime, and running the graph within it [28].
5.2

Experimenting with simple Softmax Regression
Softmax Regression can be thought of as multi-class logistic regression. Logistic

regression is a machine learning algorithm that could be used for binary classification
problems where the dependent variable is dichotomous (binary). Softmax regression
could be thought of as a generalization of logistic regression that could handle multiple
classes. The sigmoid function from logistic regression is replaced by the softmax
function. There are a set of weights and biases, that along with the input images are
used as the input for the softmax function. After processing, it outputs the probability
for the image belonging to each input class. Figure 14 [29] would help in understanding
the difference between the logistic regression and softmax regression machine learning
algorithms [29].
Softmax regression is especially useful for the task in our hand as we want to
effectively discover to which malware family a given image belongs to from amongst
the various families. Softmax regression outputs the probability of the given image
belonging to each class in the input. It consists of two steps: Adding up evidence
that our input belongs to a certain class and then we convert that evidence into
probabilities. Expressed in mathematical notation, it is defined as
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Figure 14: Logistic Regression vs. Softmax Regression.

(𝑖)

(𝑖)

𝑒(𝑧

𝑃 (𝑦 = 𝑗|𝑧 ) = 𝜑(𝑠𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥) (𝑧 ) = ∑︀𝑘

𝑗=0
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(𝑖) )
(𝑖)

𝑒(𝑧𝑘

)

(1)

𝑧 = 𝑤 0 𝑥0 + 𝑤 1 𝑥1 + · · · + 𝑤 𝑚 𝑥 𝑚 =

𝑚
∑︁

𝑤𝑙 𝑥𝑙 = 𝑤(𝑇 ) 𝑥.

(2)

𝑙=0

This can be expressed in matrix form it is as shown in Figure 15 [28].

Figure 15: Softmax Regression Matrix Form.
This could be vectorized as shown in Figure 16 [28].

Figure 16: Softmax Regression in Simplified Matrix Form.
It would be clear from the above expression that we would represent the variables, 𝑊 ,𝑥 and 𝑏 as tensors. These would then be used in the construction of the
computational graph. This graph would then be run by creating a session. This way
all the heavy computations have been offloaded from Python while still retaining the
easy to code and read attributes of Python.
In order to train the model, we would need a cost function and we would need to
minimize the cost. The lower the cost the better the model. For this experiment we
would be using ‘‘cross-entropy’’ to determine the loss of the model which is as defined
as
𝐻𝑦′ (𝑦) = −

∑︁
𝑖
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𝑦𝑖′ log(𝑦𝑖 )

(3)

It could be thought of as a function wherein the closer you are to the output the
smaller the cross-entropy and is a better measure than mean squared error when it
comes to the case of neural networks which output probabilities. To illustrate this
further consider an example wherein you are trying to predict the probability of 3
images as belonging to either of 3 malware families (Family A, B, C ).

Figure 17: Cross Entropy Example.
From the above table it could be seen that both the neural networks have predicted
the same outcomes and hence have the same classification error but Neural Network 1
has more confidence in the predictions that were right (Predicted Probability of 0.8
vs 0.4 for Neural Network 2) and hence is the better model. Also, you will see that
mean squared error (MSE) places much emphasis on incorrect predictions and hence
using cross-entropy is much more preferable [30].
For this experiment we will be using the gradient descent algorithm to optimize
or minimize the cross-entropy function. What this means is that gradient descent
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algorithm will find the best values for W and B by iteratively trying out different
values and in each iteration it picks a better value for these parameters. Think of
it as a bowl, wherein the goal is to reach the bottom of the bowl, this is shown in
Figure 18 [31]. Gradient descent is usually used when it is impossible or very hard to
compute the parameters analytically, say by using linear algebra etc.

Figure 18: Gradient Descent.
The learning rate is the parameter that defines how big of a step we take downhill,
if we take a very big step we run the risk of missing the minimum point and if we
take a step that is too small it would take longer for the algorithm to converge. 0.5
is usually a safe value to start with, but one should experiment with various values
for this parameter so as to arrive at a value that converges fast as well as finds the
minimum point. Finally, a session is created and the computational graph created
early is run using it.
Table 11 lists the conditions under which this experiment was carried out. For
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this experiment Python 2.7 was used on Ubuntu 14.04. TensorFlow, Numpy were
some of the important packages used, when it came to datasets ‘‘Malimg’’ was used
in these experiments.
OS
Ubuntu 14.04
Python
2.7
Python Libraries TensorFlow, Numpy, PIL
Datasets
Malimg
Table 11: Experimental Setup for simple neural networks.

The experiment was performed with 1,2,3,4 and 5 families. The cost function was
‘‘cross-entropy’’, the optimization function was ‘‘gradient descent’’ with the ‘‘learning
rate’’ set to 0.5 and the activation function was ‘‘softmax’’. It was observed that as
we increased the number of families, the accuracy of the model kept decreasing as
shown in Figure 19.
Table 12 shows that the accuracy was 100% when there was only one malware
family in the test run.
NO. OF FAMILIES

OPTIMIZER

LOSS FUNCTION

ACCURACY RESULT

1

Gradient Descent
Optimizer

Cross Entropy

100

FAMILIES IN THE
RUN

TRAINING FILES

TESTING FILES

TOTAL FILES

Adialer.C

100

22

122

Total

100

22
Table 12: No of families - 1.

122

Table 13 shows that the accuracy did not drop when two families were considered
in the test run.
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Figure 19: Simple Neural Network Scores.
However, when the 3rd family was introduced, we see that the accuracy dropped
to 88% in Table 14.
With the addition of one more family the accuracy went down drastically to 59%
as shown in Table 15.
Adding the 5th family resulted in the accuracy dropping to 57% as shown in
Table 16.
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NO. OF FAMILIES

OPTIMIZER

LOSS FUNCTION

ACCURACY RESULT

2

Gradient Descent
Optimizer

Cross Entropy

100

FAMILIES IN THE
RUN

TRAINING FILES

TESTING FILES

TOTAL FILES

Adialer.C

100

22

122

Agent.FYI

98

18

116

Total

198

NO. OF FAMILIES

OPTIMIZER

LOSS FUNCTION

ACCURACY RESULT

3

Gradient Descent
Optimizer

Cross Entropy

88.02

FAMILIES IN THE
RUN

TRAINING FILES

TESTING FILES

TOTAL FILES

Adialer.C

100

22

122

Agent.FYI

98

18

116

Allaple.A

2655

294

2949

Total

2853

40
Table 13: No of families - 2.

334
Table 14: No of families - 3.
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238

3187

NO. OF FAMILIES

OPTIMIZER

LOSS FUNCTION

ACCURACY RESULT

4

Gradient Descent
Optimizer

Cross Entropy

59.63

FAMILIES IN THE
RUN

TRAINING FILES

TESTING FILES

TOTAL FILES

Adialer.C

100

22

122

Agent.FYI

98

18

116

Allaple.A

2655

294

2949

Allaple.L

1432

159

1591

Total

4285

NO. OF FAMILIES

OPTIMIZER

LOSS FUNCTION

ACCURACY RESULT

5

Gradient Descent
Optimizer

Cross Entropy

57.42

FAMILIES IN THE
RUN

TRAINING FILES

TESTING FILES

TOTAL FILES

Adialer.C

100

22

122

Agent.FYI

98

18

116

Allaple.A

2655

294

2949

Allaple.L

1432

159

1591

Allueron.gen!J

179

19

198

Total

4464

493
Table 15: No of families - 4.

512
Table 16: No of families - 5.

40

4778

4976

The results are as expected, the simple neural network had a 92% accuracy in
classifying the MNIST dataset(Handwritten Digits), so it is not that surprising that it
has not done well with the ‘‘Malimg’’ malware images dataset.
5.3

Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) can be thought of as a specialized case

of the regular neural networks in that they also have a set of learn able weights and
biases but they make the explicit assumption that they will be used for problems
involving image recognition. This assumption helps to encode certain properties in
the architecture, make the forward function easier to implement and vastly reduce
the number of parameters in the network [32].
5.3.1

What is Convolution

A convolutional neural network gets its name from the ‘‘convolution’’ operator.
This is the function that extracts features from the input image space. Given below
is a small example of how the convolution works over an image. Consider a 5 x 5
matrix which represents the image and a 3 x 3 matrix called the ‘‘filter’’ like the one
in Figure 20 [33].

Figure 20: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Example.
You move the ‘‘filter’’ over the image matrix, multiply each cell and add them
up to come up with the resultant 3 x 3 matrix. This series of steps is illustrated in
the below sequence of images.
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Each step involves taking the sub matrix of size 3 x 3, starting at 0,0. The dot
product of this matrix with the filter is then calculated. The sum of all dot products
make up the value of the first cell in the resultant matrix.
Figure 21 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
0,0.

Figure 21: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 1.
Figure 22 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
0,1.

Figure 22: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 2.
Figure 23 [33] the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index 0,2.

Figure 23: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 3.
Figure 24 [33] the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index 1,0.

Figure 24: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 4.
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Figure 25 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
1,1.

Figure 25: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 5.
Figure 26 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
1,2.

Figure 26: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 6.
Figure 27 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
2,0.

Figure 27: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 7.
Figure 28 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
2,1.

Figure 28: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 8.
Figure 29 [33] shows the convolution step for the 3 x 3 matrix starting at index
2,2.
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Figure 29: Convolutional Neural Network - Convolution Step 9.
As shown above, the ‘‘filter’’ is slid over the input image pixel by pixel, which is
sometimes referred to as ‘‘stride’’, and for every position the element wise product
is computed and is summed up across the row. The resultant 3 x 3 matrix is called
‘‘Feature Map’’, these act as feature detectors for the input image.
One could understand from the above explanation that using different ‘‘filter’’
will result in the CNN learning different features from the input image. Different
filters produce different outcomes on the image. Operations such as edge detection,
sharpening of the image, blurring of the image etc could be done with the help of
filters. Figure 30 [33] shows an example of a blurring filter.
A CNN learns the values for these ‘‘filters’’ over the period of its training, but
parameters such as number of filters, filter size, architecture of the network need
to be specified before the training process is started. It is intuitive that there is a
tradeoff between the number of filters and the training time. The more the number
of filters the more features the CNN learns but the longer the training time will be.
Figure 31 [33] summarizes what different ‘‘filters’’ will produce.
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Figure 30: Convolutional Neural Network - Blurring Filter Example Image.

45

Figure 31: Convolutional Neural Network - Filter Example.
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5.3.2

Architecture

In a CNN, since we have made the design consideration that we will be working
with images only we are allowed the freedom to make some changes to how the neurons
are stacked in comparison to a regular Neural Networks. A CNN has neurons stacked
in three dimensions of width, height and depth. Instead of being connected to all
neurons from the previous layers, a neuron will only be connected to a small subset
of the neurons in the previous layers. Figures 32, 33 [32] illustrates the differences
between a regular neural network and a convolutional neural network.

Figure 32: Regular Neural Network.

Figure 33: Convolutional Neural Network.
The CNN is made up of a sequence of layers, and each layer transforms the
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activation it gets as input to an output through some function which could be
differentiated (The Cost function). There are three main types of layers, they are
convolutional layer, pooling layer and fully-connected layer. The operations of the
convolutional layer were explained in the previous section. The pool layer performs
downsampling operation along the height and width dimensions. Downsampling is
just a fancy way of saying that you look at each ‘‘feature map’’ and choose the most
interesting pixel. The most interesting pixel is just the pixel with the maximum value,
hence the name ‘‘max-pooling’’, Figure 34 [33] gives a visual representation of the
process.

Figure 34: Convolutional Neural Network - Max-pooling.
Once the max-pooled array is formed the only remaining step left is to pass it to
a ‘‘Fully connected network’’ that can make a prediction as to the class to which the
input image belongs to. An example of a real world CNN is given in Figure 35 [33].

Figure 35: Real World Convolutional Neural Network.
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5.3.3

Putting it all together in the experiment

Table 17 lists the conditions under which this experiment was carried out. For
this experiment Python 2.7 was used on Ubuntu 14.04. TFLearn, a layer of abstraction
on top of TensorFlow, Numpy were some of the important packages used, when it
came to datasets ‘‘Malicia’’ was used in these experiments.
OS
Ubuntu 14.04
Python
2.7
Python Libraries TensorFlow, TFLearn, Numpy, PIL
Datasets
Malimg
Table 17: Experimental Setup for deep learning.

As explained in the previous sections a convolutional neural network consists of
the below steps:
1. Breaking the input image into overlapping tiles
2. Feeding each tile to a smaller neural network
3. Saving the result from each tile into a new array
4. Downsampling the array to reduce the size of the array
5. Making a prediction
There is no limit as to the number of convolutions, max-pooling or fully connected
layers involved. The principal idea is to break down a given imaged into smaller
portions and filter it down to a single final result. The more the number of convolutions
the more complex the features the CNN learns.
A convolutional neural network was trained on 2 families of the ‘‘Mallmg’’ dataset.
It had 3 convolution layers, 2 max-pool layers and 2 fully connected layers. The
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results from the experiment showing the runtime and the accuracy scores are shown
in Figure 36 and Figure 37.

Figure 36: Convolutional Neural Network Results.

Figure 37: Convolutional Neural Network Results.
5.3.4

Disadvantages of Neural Networks

1. Neural networks work like a black box, wherein it is not possible to ascertain
with certainty what features are being learned. In essence this makes it difficult
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to fix misclassification’s.
2. Arriving at the right convolutional network usually requires a lot of experimentation. There is no one size fits all and each image classification problem
requires fine tuning the parameters to arrive at the right model as evident from
the results.
3. The time taken to run these on a CPU only machine is prohibitive. The same
experiment could probably be run in around an hour using the latest GPUs
though.
4. Neural networks work like a black box, wherein it is not possible to ascertain
with certainty what features are being learned.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
The gist features based scores along with univariate feature selection proved to
be both efficient and better than some of the other more complex neural network
based scores from our tests. However, when some of the malware images are salted
with other images, the accuracy suffered.
Some of the future work that would be interesting is to answer questions like what
would happen if all images from across families are salted. It would be interesting to
see if that results in gist features picking up important information from those images
used for salting and if that would result in good clustering or if the salted images
completely confuse the gist based scoring and hence beat the system.
Arriving at the right number of convolution layers, filters and max pooling layers
is usually done by trial and error. It would also be a good experiment to run various
convolutional neural networks to identify the correct set of parameters that should be
used for this dataset and to see if this could be extended do well on malware belonging
to other datasets. Another interesting question to answer when salting images is to
see if the images that are used for salting purposes would become interesting features
when learning features with convolutional neural networks.
It would be interesting to use principal component analysis on these salted images,
as it would most probably separate the image used for salting and the actual malware
image as they are very different in structure. Hence, this could act as the first layer
of filtering before either running tests using gist features or convolutional neural
networks.
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